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The use of “Big Data” in policy and decision making is a current topic of debate. The 2013 murder
of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, UK led to an extensive public reaction on social
media, providing the opportunity to study the spread of online hate speech (cyber hate) on Twitter.
Human annotated Twitter data was collected in the immediate aftermath of Rigby’s murder to train
and test a supervised machine learning text classifier that distinguishes between hateful and/or
antagonistic responses with a focus on race, ethnicity, or religion; and more general responses.
Classification features were derived from the content of each tweet, including grammatical
dependencies between words to recognize “othering” phrases, incitement to respond with
antagonistic action, and claims of well-founded or justified discrimination against social groups.
The results of the classifier were optimal using a combination of probabilistic, rule-based, and
spatial-based classifiers with a voted ensemble meta-classifier. We demonstrate how the results of the
classifier can be robustly utilized in a statistical model used to forecast the likely spread of cyber
hate in a sample of Twitter data. The applications to policy and decision making are discussed.
KEY WORDS: Twitter, hate speech, Internet, policy, machine classification, statistical modeling, cyber
hate, ensemble classifier
Introduction
Research using traditional surveys and interviews has identified that crimes
with a prejudicial motive are influenced in the short term by singular events such
as widely publicized murders (Phillips, 1980, on homicide), riots (Bobo,
Zubrinsky, Johnson, & Oliver, 1994, on race relations), and court cases and
terrorism (King & Sutton, 2013, on hate crime; Legewie, 2013, on anti-immigrant
sentiment). Hate crimes have been shown to cluster in time and tend to increase,
sometimes dramatically, in the aftermath of an antecedent or “trigger” event
(King & Sutton, 2013). The impacts of hate crime on individuals and communities
are well documented (see Williams & Tregidga, 2014) and most research is
preoccupied with where hate crimes happen (risky neighborhoods, demographic
factors, etc.), while there is little research that looks at when they happen. King
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and Sutton (2013) report that 481 hate crimes with a specific anti-Islamic motive
occurred in the year following 9/11, with 58 percent of them perpetrated two
weeks following the event (4 percent of the at-risk period). Such evidence
demonstrates that crimes entailing a prejudicial motive often occur in close
temporal proximity to galvanizing events, such as terrorist attacks. It is during
this period that decision makers, particularly those responsible for minimizing
the risk of social disorder through community reassurance, local policing, and the
online governance of hateful and antagonistic content, require additional informa-
tion on the likelihood of disruption.
Hate crimes are communicative acts, often provoked by events that incite
retribution in the targeted group, toward the group that share similar character-
istics to the perpetrators (King & Sutton, 2013). Collecting and analyzing temporal
data allows decision makers to study the escalation, duration, diffusion, and de-
escalation of hate crimes following “trigger” events. However, decision makers
are often limited in the information that can be obtained in the immediate
aftermath of such events. When data can be obtained, they are often of low
granularity, subject to missing information (hate crimes are largely unreported to
the police), and invariably retrospective. However, the recent widespread
adoption of social media offers a new opportunity to address these data
problems. The continued growth of online social networks and microblogging
Web services, such as Twitter, enable a locomotive, extensive and near real-time
data source through which the analysis of hateful and antagonistic responses to
“trigger” events can be undertaken. Such data affords researchers with the
possibility to measure the online social mood and emotion following large-scale,
disruptive, and emotive events such terrorist attacks in near real-time.
Twitter is a defensible and logical source of data for such analysis given that
users of social media are more likely to express emotional content due to
deindividuation (anonymity, lack of self-awareness in groups, disinhibition)
(Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). There is also a case history relating to
the expression of hateful sentiment on social media in the United Kingdom,
providing evidence of “real world” criminal justice response to, and therefore
criminalization of, online acts of targeted hateful communication. For example, in
2012, Liam Stacey was sentenced to 56 days in prison for posting racially
offensive comments on Twitter after a U.K. Premier League footballer’s cardiac
arrest, and in 2014, Declan McCuish was jailed for a year for tweeting racist
comments about two Glasgow Rangers football players.
To date there has been very little research into the manifestation and
diffusion of hate speech and antagonistic content in social media in relation to
events that could be classed as “trigger” events for hate crimes. In 2013, the
murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich (London) by Islamic extremists led
to an extensive social media reaction. Given the extreme terrorist motive and
public nature of the actions it was conceivable that the public response might
include written expressions of hateful and antagonistic sentiment toward a
particular race, ethnicity, or religion, which could be interpreted as “hate speech.”
In this article, we present a supervised machine learning text classifier trained
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and tested to identify online hate speech—or cyber hate—using data collected
from Twitter in the immediate aftermath of Lee Rigby’s murder. The data were
annotated by human coders, who were asked to decide whether the tweets they
were shown contained hateful and/or antagonistic responses toward minority
groups.
As “Big Data” is a growing topic of study, and its use in policy and decision
making a current subject of debate (Gonza´lez-Bailo´n, 2013), we discuss the use of
supervised machine learning tools to classify a sample of “Big Data,” and how
the results can be interpreted for use in policy and decision making. Data from
Twitter, and social media more generally, are exceptionally noisy and contain a
great deal of grammatical variance, misinformation, and mundane chatter. Due to
the poor veracity of such data in its raw form, its use in policymaking is
somewhat hindered. A key contribution of this study is therefore the production
of a machine classifier that could be developed into a technical solution for use by
policymakers as part of an existing evidence-based decision-making process.
Further contributions of the paper are the identification of nuanced features of
cyber hate on social media using a particular type of syntactic relationship within
text as a classification feature, and the application of an ensemble machine
classifier to cyber hate. We include a section on how the classifier can be finely
trained to suit the needs of policymakers, in order to minimize error and
maximize confidence in results. We then demonstrate how the results of the
classifier can be robustly utilized in a statistical model used to forecast the likely
spread of cyber hate in a sample of Twitter data.
Related Work
The analysis of subjective language has been widely applied to the classifica-
tion of opinions and emotions in text (Wiebe, 2005). Indeed, sentiment analysis,
which aims to annotate text using a scale that is a measure of the degree of
negative and positive sentiment within the text, has been applied to data collected
from social media to determine emotional differences between genders on
MySpace (Thelwall, Wilkinson, & Uppal, 2010b) and study levels of positive and
negative sentiment in Facebook (Ahktar & Soria, 2009) and Twitter comments
(Bollen, Goncalves, Ruan, & Mao, 2011; Thelwall, Buckley, & Paltogou, 2011)
following real-world events.
Specifically focusing on hateful and/or antagonistic content, Greevy and
Smeaton (2004) classified racist content in Web pages using a supervised machine
learning approach with a bag-of-words (BoW) as features. A BoW approach uses
words within a corpus as predictive features and ignores word sequence as well
as any syntactic or semantic content. This approach can lead to misclassification
due to word use in different contexts and, if words are used as a primary features
for classification, it has been shown that combining sequential words into n-
grams (list of words occurring in sequence from 1–n) improves classifier
performance by incorporating some degree of context into the features (Pendar,
2007). However, an n-gram approach can suffer from the problem of high levels
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of distance between related words—for example, if related words appear near the
start and near the end of a sentence (Chen, Zhou, Zhu, & Xu, 2012). Dadvar,
Trieschnigg, and de Jong (2013) used profane words in a social media account
username, references to profanities and bullying-sensitive topics, and first and
second person pronouns to classify antagonistic behavior on YouTube. Dinakar,
Jones, Havasi, Lieberman, and Picard (2012) also focused on the identification of
cyberbullying using a BoW approach, but also incorporated lists of profane
words, parts-of-speech and words with negative connotations as machine
learning features. Furthermore, they included a common-sense reasoning ap-
proach to classification by using a database that encoded particular knowledge
about bullying situations (e.g., associating wearing dresses with males).
Burnap et al. (2013) developed a rule-based approach to classifying antagonis-
tic content on Twitter and, similarly to Dinakar et al. (2012), they used
associational terms as features. They also included accusational and attributional
terms targeted at a person or persons following a socially disruptive event as
features, in an effort to capture the context of the term use. Their results
demonstrated an improvement on standard learning techniques (see also
Williams et al., 2013). Chen et al. (2012) identified offensive content by using
profanities, obscenities, and pejorative terms as features, weighted accordingly
based on the associated strength of the term, as well as references to people. They
also produced a set of rules to model offensive content, showing an improvement
on standard machine learning approaches in terms of a much-reduced false
negative rate.
Identifying syntactic constructs that tend to be insulting or condescending is
a key function of the “Smokey” abusive message classification tool (Spertus,
1997), which uses pattern matching and syntactic positioning of words within text
to classify content at a message level. Mahmud, Ahmed, and Khan (2008)
followed a similar approach but also incorporated relationships between terms to
identify “flaming” behavior online. The identification of syntactic relationships
within text is possible via the development of parsing tools such as the Typed
Dependency parser from Stanford (Marneffe, MacCartney, & Manning, 2006),
though this has yet to be applied to hate speech.
Data Collection
We collected the study data set from Twitter during a two-week time window
following the “trigger” event—the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich,
London, UK on May 22, 2013. To ensure we maximized the collection of data
surrounding the event we used the search term “woolwich,” which would
include many references to the events at Woolwich and also the main hashtag
surrounding the event “#woolwich.” The hashtag convention is widely used on
Twitter to link an individual’s thoughts and comments to an event.
The two-week data collection window was imposed based on three factors.
First, existing research indicates that public interest in events typically spikes a
short time after the event, and then rapidly declines (Downs, 1972). Second, this
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first point was confirmed by tracking the search term “Woolwich” using the
Google Trends service,1 which records the relative number of searches performed
on Google over time. Within two weeks, the use of “Woolwich” in Google
searches had almost returned to preevent levels. Third, more than half of all hate-
related attacks following 9/11 occurred within two weeks of the event; and we
wanted to measure the immediate reaction to such events and capture data that
perhaps would not otherwise be available to policy and decision makers due to
the time taken to collect, record, and process hate crime results, and therefore be
proactive in the first two weeks to reduce harm to targeted social groups in an
appropriate manner. Social media data lend themselves to this purpose given
their inherent fine-grained temporal characteristics. Tweets are produced by the
second, while curated and administrative data have a much higher degree of
latency in terms of both availability to decision makers and measurement of
reaction. A total of 450,000 tweets were collected during the study window.
Data Annotation—Crowdsourcing
Building models to classify data according to a predefined coding scheme is
an essential task in digital social research, used for the purposes of understanding
social interactions, beliefs, emotions, and the like. In this research, once the
Twitter data were collected, we built a supervised machine learning classifier to
distinguish between hateful and/or antagonistic responses with a focus on race,
ethnicity, religion, and more general responses, following the event. To complete
this subjective task using large-scale data analytics, which is absolutely necessary
for the volumes of data produced, we used machine classifiers to learn the
features of tweets that are indicative of the class they belong to (cyber hate or
general response).
Once features were learned, we applied the model to the whole data set.
However, it was essential to understand and explain the limitations of the learned
model by producing model-specific classification performance results, such as
precision and recall per class, and confusion matrices (terms that are explained in
detail later). Thus, we needed a “gold standard” against which to test the
classification model. Commonly, this is obtained by sampling from a larger data
set and employing human annotators to label each data point (tweet) according to
a coding frame (Burnap et al., 2013). The coding frame serves as a set of
categories or classes into which each data point can be classified. Computationally
crowdsourcing human annotations is now becoming popular, and Web services
such as CrowdFlower or the Amazon Mechanical Turk provide programmatic
application programming interfaces (APIs) through which researchers can
automatically upload a data set, coding frame, and set of instructions for
annotation. The results of the annotation tasks can then be split into training and
testing data sets for machine learning.
From the 450,000 tweets collected, we sampled 2,000 to be human coded.
Coders were provided with each tweet and the question: “is this text offensive or
antagonistic in terms of race ethnicity or religion?” They were presented with a
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ternary set of classes—yes, no, undecided. We utilized the CrowdFlower online
service that allows for Human Intelligence Tasks, such as coding text into classes,
to be distributed over multiple workers. Workers can sign up to the service to
participate in tasks in return for micropayments (small payments set by the task
creator based on the number of tasks completed to an acceptable standard). Task
creators can also specify a range of worker requirements such as location and
experience, and can verify the level of expertise via test questions. Results from
workers can then either be accepted or rejected, based on level of agreement with
other workers.
CrowdFlower recruits from its pool of workers until each unit of analysis (in
this case, each tweet) is annotated by a minimum number of workers, as specified
by the task creator. We required at least four human annotations per tweet as per
the convention in related research (Thelwall, Buckley, Paltogou, Cai, & Kappas,
2010a). CrowdFlower provides an agreement score for each annotated unit, which
is based on the majority vote of the trusted workers (Kolhatkar, Zinsmeister, &
Hirst, 2013). Because CrowdFlower continues to recruit workers until the task is
complete, there is no guarantee that all workers will annotate the same set of
units. Indeed, in this case we had 158 workers contribute to the task, each
annotating a sample of tweets. Therefore we cannot calculate traditional interrater
reliability scores, such as Krippendorf’s Alpha or Cohen’s Kappa to determine
agreement between all annotators. However, CrowdFlower has been shown to
produce an agreement score that compares well to these classic measures
(Kolhatkar et al., 2013).
Based on the output from our annotator task we can determine agreement on
each unit. The purpose of the experiments performed in this article are to establish
the accuracy of a machine classifier when annotating tweets as hateful and/or
antagonistic or not, and thus it is the agreement score for the unit of analysis
(each tweet), and not the overall human agreement for all units that is important
for validation. We removed all tweets with less than 75 percent agreement and
also those upon which the coders could reach an absolute decision (i.e., the
“undecided” class)—again, following established methods from related research
(Thelwall et al., 2010a). The results of the annotation exercise produced a “gold
standard” data set of 1,901 tweets, with 222 instances of offensive or antagonistic
content (11.68 percent of the annotated sample), which could be classed as cyber
hate (referred to below as the “cyber hate sample”), and 1,679 instances of
nonhateful or antagonistic commentary (88.32 percent), which we will refer to as
“benign.” Ten percent of each class was subsequently used as a sample from
which to identify appropriate features to build a cyber hate classifier. This
subsample was not used when testing the classifier.
Feature Selection
It was evident from the cyber hate sample that many of the terms used in
cyber hate were expletives or derogatory, targeted at specific social groups. The
sample contained words that are well known derogatory terms for black, asian,
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and muslim social groups, as well as derogatory adjectives (e.g., “black savages”).
It was evident that the words of the tweets were going to be particularly useful
features for the classification task. Using the words of the text to be classified,
known as a BoW technique, is not a particularly novel approach to text
classification, but the frequency of particular unigram (single word) and bigram
(two word) terms were overwhelming and needed to be utilized.
Of more interest from a sociological and common sense reasoning
perspective were the numerous instances in the cyber hate sample of calls for
collective action and hateful incitement toward social groups exhibiting
protected characteristics. For instance, there were exclamations such as “send
them home,” “get them out,” and “should be hung.” These exclamations
clearly follow a pattern that could be encoded in parts-of-speech notation
[e.g., Verb, Pronoun, Noun; Verb, Pronoun, Adverb; Verb, Verb, Verb(PT)].
However, the benign sample also displayed an abundance of similar patterns,
such as “leave them alone,” or “they are peaceful.” Thus, parts-of-speech
tagging to produce features to inform the machine classifier was avoided, as it
seemed highly likely to cause confusion between the classes. Instead, we
implemented the Stanford Lexical Parser, along with a context-free lexical
parsing model, to extract typed dependencies within the tweet text (Marneffe
et al., 2006). Typed dependencies provide a representation of syntactic
grammatical relationships in a sentence (or tweet in this case) that can be
used as features for classification. The following example explains the
meaning of such relationships and how they can be used as features to inform
the machine classifier.
Consider the sentence:
“Totally fed up with the way this country has turned into a haven for
terrorists. Send them all back home.”
The typed dependency parser returns the following output:
[root(ROOT-0, Send-1), nsubj(home-5, them-2), det(home-5, all-3), amod-
(home-5, back-4), xcomp(Send-1, home-5)]
Within the output we can see five instances of typed dependencies. The
second instance (nsubj(home-5, them-2)) identifies a relationship between “home”
and “them,” with “home” being the fifth word in the sentence and “them”
appearing before “home” as the second word. Word order within a sentence is
preserved in the type dependency and provides a feature for classification as well
as the syntactic relationship between words. The relationship identified by the
parser in this case is nsubj, which is an abbreviation of nominal subject. This will
include a noun phrase (“them”), which is the syntactic subject in the sentence,
and an associated relational term (“home”). Linguistically therefore, the term
“them” is associated with “home” in a relational sense. Sociologically, this is an
“othering” phrase, which essentially distances “them” from “us” through the
relational action of removing “them” to their “home,” as perceived by the author
of the tweet.
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Similarly, the third typed dependency (det(home-5, all-3)) identifies a det
relationship, which is short for determiner, where a link is established between a
noun phrase and its determiner. The noun phrase here being “home” (as in a
place) and the determiner being “all.” Again, this falls into an “othering”
behavior, suggesting that the entire social group to which the Woolwich
perpetrators belonged should have a relationship with “home,” which we can
assume means the perceived “home” of the social group by the author of the
tweet (i.e., “not my country”). This combination of linguistics and sociology
potentially provides a very interesting set of features for the more nuanced
classification of cyber hate, beyond the BoW approach that utilizes expletives and
derogatory terms. It allows a more common-sense reasoning approach to
classifying cyber hate by considering the integration of “othering” terms and calls
for retribution action into the classification features.
Data Preprocessing and Feature Preparation
Each tweet was computationally transformed into a word vector—a list of all
the individual words (tokens) in the tweet. All tokens we transformed to lower
case to avoid capitalized versions of words being treated as separate features to
lower case versions of the same word. Nonalphanumeric characters other than
those present in emoticons and exclamatory punctuation were removed, stop
words were removed, and we stemmed each token to ensure that multiple
representations and tenses of a word could be considered as a single features; for
example, “attacked,” “attackers,” and “attacking” can all be reduced to “attack”
so the machine can consider the verb as a single predictive feature, as well as the
various forms of the verb. Tokens within each tweet were then clustered into
sequential groups of tokens, or n-grams, ranging from one to five tokens in length
to preserve an element of context for each word by encapsulating their
surrounding words within a feature. Single tokens, or unigrams, were prominent
in the cyber hate sample in the form of expletives or derogatory terms. Two-token
combinations, or bigrams, were also present in the form of combinations of
expletives, adjectives, and derogatory terms. Three-token terms (trigrams) could
represent “othering” and incitements of retributional action, such as “send them
home” or “get them out.” Four- and five-token terms contained extended but
similar phrases.
The BoW approach used here is fairly unsophisticated as a feature identifica-
tion method, as it weights each n-gram equally as a feature and is likely to lead
to confusion within the classification task when words occur frequently in both
classes. Therefore, two experiments were conducted at the classification stage
where in the first experiment all n-grams were retained as classification features,
while in the second, only hateful and derogatory terms sampled from an online
racial slur database2 were retained, and the remaining n-grams were removed.
Classification results were produced for each experiment. It was expected that the
hateful terms would be predictive of cyber hate, but we were interested to see if
other terms were also statistically significant predictors.
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To produce a more sophisticated classifier capable of learning the grammati-
cal structure of tweets containing cyber hate, each tweet was transformed into a
set of typed dependencies using the Stanford Parser. Each typed dependency was
considered as a unigram feature, and we again performed clustering on all the
typed dependencies in a tweet to identify groups of between one and three typed
dependency n-grams that represented the syntactic structure of each tweet. The
number of possible typed dependency relationships produced by the Stanford
model is around 50, and we suspected that not all relationships would be useful
for classification.
As with the BoW experiments, at the classification stage we performed a two-
step approach. The first experiment involved testing the classifier using all typed
dependencies as features. We then performed a meta-analysis to better determine
which features were more statistically significant at classifying cyber hate. To
achieve this we ran a Bayesian Logistic Regression (BLR) using the typed
dependency features extracted from the 10 percent sample of gold standard cyber
hate and benign tweets. We used the model output of the BLR to establish a list
of statistical coefficients relating to the probability of each typed dependencies n-
gram occurring in a hateful or antagonistic tweet. The list was sorted to identify
the most likely forms of typed dependency relationship to occur in the cyber hate
class, and these relationships alone were retained as predictive features when the
classifier was retrained and re-evaluated in a second experiment.
Finally, we combined both experiments and produced a final testing scenario
to determine if combining the BoW, typed dependencies, and hateful and
derogatory n-grams would prove to be the optimal set of features.
Model Selection
Given our feature set of specific words and syntactic features, we aimed to
create a set of results and related model that could be used to inform
policymakers of the risk of cyber hate spreading online following events that are
likely to incur a hateful or antagonistic response toward a specific social group.
To produce experimental results we used the Java Weka machine learning
libraries to develop a number of supervised classifiers that were trained and
tested using the features discussed in the previous section. Each tweet was
transformed into a feature vector—a list of attributes that represent the tweet for
the purposes of training a classifier. Each vector included the actual class the
tweet belonged to based on the human annotation exercises (reduced to a binary
“Yes” or “No” as to whether it was hateful or antagonistic or not), and a list of n-
grams that either included words, typed dependencies, or a combination of both,
depending on the feature set used to train the classifier.
Given the prevalence of individual words or short combinations of words in
the cyber hate sample, it was appropriate to implement a classifier that would
make decisions based on the likelihood of feature occurrence. We implemented a
BLR classifier as a probabilistic approach. This classifier identifies statistical
coefficients for each feature in a vector based on the likelihood of that feature
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appearing in any of the classes available (“Yes” or “No”) and uses this to predict
the classes of previously unseen tweets.
Rule-based approaches to classifying antagonistic content have been shown to
produce promising results in previous research, and the case of cyber hate
seemed similar to other work in its accusational and targeted construct. Therefore,
we employed a Random Forest Decision Tree (RFDT) as a rule-based approach to
classification. A decision tree approach was chosen because it iteratively identifies
the feature from the vector that maximizes information gain in a classification
exercise—or put another way, it quantifies the significance of how using one n-
gram as a rule to classify a tweet as “Yes,” reduces the uncertainty as to which
class it belongs to. Performing this step multiple times creates a hierarchical and
incremental set of rules that can be used to make classification decisions. A
Random Forest implementation of a decision tree was used because it iteratively
selects a random subsample of features in the training phase and trains multiple
decision trees before predicting the outputs and averaging out the results,
maximizing the reduction in classification error (Breiman, 2001). The approach
combines the results of a number of decision trees to identify the optimal set of
rules, which was appropriate in this case because of the amount of noise and
grammatical variance within the training and testing data sets.
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) was also used to determine if a spatial
classification model would improve or enhance on a probabilistic or rule-based
model. Feature vectors are plotted in high-dimensional space, and hyperplanes (lines
that separate the data points) are used to try to find the optimum way to divide the
space such that the tweets belonging to “Yes” and “No” classes are separated.
Multiple hyperplanes can be used and the optimal hyperplane will be the line that
maximizes the separation between classes. The rationale for the use of an SVM
classifier was to determine whether cyber hate tweets and general responses to an
event could be separated by spatial differences in lexical or syntactic features, as
well as with probability and rules to determine predictive feature efficiency.
In addition to the three individual classifiers, we also implemented an
“ensemble” classifier where a combination of all three was used to make a final
classification decision. We used a voting meta-classifier, which produces a
classification result for each base classifier (BLR, RFDT, and SVM) during the
training phase, before making a decision on which model to use based on its
prediction accuracy. A choice can be made based on the base classifier with the
maximum probability or minimum probability; the results of all base classifiers
can be averaged; or a majority vote can be taken. We implemented the maximum
probability to make classification decisions, based on selecting the classification
function that is most statistically likely to reduce error.
Classification Results
A 10-fold cross-validation approach was used to train and test the supervised
machine learning methods. This approach has previously been used for building
machine classifiers for short text (e.g., Thelwall et al., 2010a). It functions by
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iteratively training the classifier with features from 10 percent of the manually
coded data set, and classifying the remaining 90 percent as “unseen” data, based
on the features evident in the cases it has encountered in the training data. It then
determines the accuracy of the classification process and moves on to the next
iteration, finally calculating the overall accuracy.
The results of the classification experiments are provided in Table 1 using
standard text classification measures of: precision (i.e., for class x, how often are
tweets classified as x when they should not be—a measure of false positives);
recall (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets not classified as x when they should
be—a measure of false negatives); and F-Measure, a harmonized mean of precision
and recall. The results for each measure range between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). The
formulae for calculating these results are as follows (where TP¼ true positives,
FP¼ false positives, TN¼ true negative, and FN¼ false negative):
Precision ¼ TP=TPþ FP
Recall ¼ TP=TPþ FN
FMeasure ¼ 2 ððP RÞ=ðPþ RÞÞ
Because of the specific interest in the accurate detection of hateful and
antagonistic content, the results reported in Table 1 are the precision, recall and f-
measure for the Yes class ONLY. The number of false positives (instances where
benign content has been classified as cyber hate) and false negatives (where cyber
hate has been classified as benign) are also reported. Table 2 provides results for
the best performing classifier and includes both Yes and No classes, as well as an
overall performance score. Table 3 presents the confusion matrix for the best
performing classifier with a breakdown of classifier error.
In Table 1, the bold text indicates the best performance results for precision,
recall, FP, and FN for each feature set. In cases such as the n-gram hateful terms
feature set, the whole row is bold because there was no difference between the
performance of the classifiers. The shaded areas indicate the best overall perform-
ing feature set for each classifier.
The results suggest that overall the most efficient features for classifying cyber
hate are n-gram typed dependencies combined with n-gram hateful and antagonis-
tic terms. In fact, the hateful terms alone achieved the same precision performance
but had a lower performance for recall. The number of false negative results
(missed instances of cyber hate) was 7 percent higher when using hateful terms
alone. This is an interesting result as it provides evidence to suggest that human
annotators identify hateful or antagonistic content on Twitter that does not
necessarily contain hateful or antagonistic terms, and requires a more nuanced
representation of what is deemed cyber hate when aiming to classify tweets.
The use of a more sophisticated set of features as well as a BoW has
successfully contributed to this requirement. A 7 percent improvement may seem
fairly small, but considering the size of the initial corpus was 450,000, and in the
annotated random sample of these data around 11 percent was considered hate
speech by the human annotators, we could infer that there were around 49,500
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instances of cyber hate in the corpus. Overlooking 7 percent of these would lead
to more than 3,000 hateful or antagonistic tweets being missed; so for policy-
making purposes, the 7 percent improvement achieved by introducing the typed
dependency features is significant if an accurate snapshot of the level of hateful
and antagonistic emotive responses to an event is to be achieved.
The number of false positives in the best performing classifiers was 19, which
constitutes 0.009 percent of the test data. Other classifiers reduced the number of
false positives to below 19 (to zero in once instance), but the recall performance in
these instances was far below that of the best performing classifiers, meaning that
a reduction in false positives was also accompanied by an increase in false
negatives. It is essential to retain a balance of minimized false positives and false
negatives. In all cases, the voted ensemble classifier matched or improved upon
the recall of each of the individual base classifiers. This suggests that combining
the output of the respective probabilistic, rule-based and spatial classifiers, and
selecting the classification decision of maximum probability can assist policy and
decision makers in reducing the oversight of hateful or antagonistic content.
While the base classifiers all achieved fairly similar results using the most efficient
features set, given the improvement of recall across all other experiments when
using a voted classifier, it would seem pertinent to consider the use of the voted
classifier as a first choice when applying the cyber hate classifier to unseen data.
The full results of the cyber hate classifier are reported in Table 2. It is clear
that the precision and recall of the non-hateful responses is very high (P¼ 0.96,
R¼ 0.98). The precision of the “Yes” class is also high (P¼ 0.89), showing a low
number of false positives, but there are improvements to be made to the recall of
the “Yes” class (R¼ 0.69) before significant confidence can be given to the results
for policy- and decision-making purposes. Table 3 shows 70 misclassifications
where cyber hate was classified as a benign response by the classifier, suggesting
Table 2. Voted Classifier Full Results
Voted Classifier
P R F
Yes 0.89 0.69 0.77
No 0.96 0.98 0.97
Overall 0.95 0.95 0.95
Table 3. Voted Classifier Confusion Matrix
Human Coders
Yes No
Machine
Yes 152 70
No 19 1,660
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a further refinement is required to detect more discrete hateful and antagonistic
content.
To give some insight into the qualitative narrative of cyber hate we have
provided some instances of typed dependencies that were probabilistically more
likely to occur in cyber hate than the benign class in Table 4. We can see that the
content of tweets focuses on a response to religious and ethnic minority social
groups from the wider population (e.g., black muslims). There are phrases
suggestive of incitement to respond with actions (e.g., burn Korans) and claims of
well founded or justified discrimination against social groups (e.g., “I told you
black people...”). Given this reflective and responsive narrative it would seem
pragmatic to include more semantic rules and constructs into feature identifica-
tion in future in order to improve classifier performance.
Cautionary Caveat
Once a supervised machine learning classifier has been developed it can be
used on a larger sample to classify new and unseen data, and inform policy
decisions directly or via additional models. First and foremost it is essential to
remember that supervised machine learning classifiers build models of what they
perceive to be the features indicative of specific classes—in this case, hateful and
antagonistic content. As a result, if new or unseen features occur, such as
different types of language or content with mixed meaning, it can cause confusion
in the classifier and produce inaccurate results. We can classify new instances,
but we must always bear in mind the limitations in the existing model (i.e., not
all instances of cyber hate were identified by our model), and that variance in the
way people respond to such events may compound this.
Table 4. Probabilistic Features Highly Likely to be in Cyber Hate
Typed Dependency Qualitative Description
det(religion-5 a-4) Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing “a”
“religion” in a particular context
amod(people-7 black-6) Adjectival modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a noun phrase)
discussing “people” who are “black”
aux(burn-6 to-5) dobj(burn-6
korans-9)
Auxiliary (a form of “be,” “do,” or “have”) action phrase using “burn”
and “korans”
amod(muslim-40 black-39) Adjectival modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a noun phrase)
discussing “muslims” who are “black”
det(muslim-40 a-38) amod
(muslim-40 black-39)
Determiner (a specific reference to a noun phrase) discussing “a”
“muslim” in the context of a “black” “muslim”
dobj(told-4 you-5) amod
(people-7 black-6)
Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) “told” “you” (e.g., “I told
you”) in the context of “black” “people”
advmod(seen-3 just-2)
dobj(seen-3 video-4)
dobj(getting-9 shot-10)
Adverbial modifier (a descriptive phrase related to a verb) “just” “seen,”
that is commenting on what has just been witnessed
dobj(burn-6 korans-9) Direct object (an accusatory object of the verb) “burn” “korans”
Note: Using a classifier to inform a statistical model.
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That said, what we have tried to achieve with the classifier is to assist human
decision making using a machine to handle the large volumes of data produced
by the general public in response to a large-scale emotive event. The results of the
cyber hate classifier are reasonably high, especially when considering that around
5 percent of our human-annotated sample had to be removed because the three
out of four humans could not agree which class a tweet belonged to. It is worth
remembering that while machine learned models are not always accurate in their
judgment, humans are also susceptible to disagreement and confusion.
Cyber Hate and Contagion Modeling
In the following example we demonstrate how the supervised machine
learning classification model of cyber hate can be applied to the whole corpus of
450,000 tweets to help determine to what degree hateful or antagonistic content is
spreading—a measure of the contagion effect of cyber hate in response to a specific
event. This could help inform those responsible for minimizing the risk of social
disorder through community reassurance, local policing, and the online gover-
nance of hateful and antagonistic content, as to whether cyber hate is likely to
spread.
One way to measure the impact of cyber hate on the spread of information on
Twitter is to treat cyber hate as a predictive feature in a statistical regression
model where the dependent variable (the outcome you are trying to predict) is
the number of retweets a tweet is likely to receive. Theoretically, the more
retweets a tweet receives, the more people are likely to see it, increasing the risk
of public exposure and opportunity to propagate and respond to cyber hate. By
measuring the statistical associated strength of cyber hate within a model of
retweet counts, we can determine the likelihood of hateful and antagonistic
content being retweeted, and therefore spreading to a large number of people.
We can define a tweet that has been retweeted a large number of times as an
information flow (Lotan, 2011).
Table 5 shows the result of a zero-inflated negative binomial model of
information flow “size.” The dependent variable is a count measure of the
number of retweets a tweet actually received following the Woolwich event. The
statistical predictors of the count include the number of followers of the person
sending the tweet, the time of day the tweet was sent, the content of the tweet
(hashtags, URLs), the sentiment polarity (þve, –ve), the number of press
headlines on the day the tweet was made, and the type of agent sending the
tweet (e.g., press, police, politician). The data for these features were all derived
from the data set collected from Twitter. For more details on how these were
derived we recommend the reader study a related paper that examined the social
media reaction in greater detail (Burnap et al., 2014). In this instance we are only
interested in the impact of cyber hate as an example of how machine classification
can help inform the modeling of online social reaction.
If we look at the incidence rate ratio (IRR) column in Table 5 we can see the
strengths of association for each predictor variable with the dependent “retweet”
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count, as indicated by the IRR. We can use the IRR to report the strength of
causal associations between certain factors and the information flow size, enabling
us to identify quantitatively which factors are more important than others. Where
an IRR >1, the difference is associated with a positive increase in the dependent
variable (retweet count), so in the case of the “URL” variable which records
whether or not a tweet contains a URL, the results indicate that the rate of retweet
for tweets containing a URL is 1.55 times higher than the rate for tweets without
a URL. Thus, a URL increases the chances of a tweet being retweeted. Where an
IRR <1, there is a negative effect. If we look at the “Cyber Hate Speech” predictor
we see the IRR is 0.55 (rounded to 2 decimal places), which means that the
Table 5. Zero-Inflated Negetive Binomial Regression Model Predicting Counts of Retweets
Count of Retweets
Poisson Model (Count/True Zeros) Coef. SE IRR
TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000
Tweet count 0.215** 0.015 0.807
Commute morning 0.030 0.048 1.030
Work 0.014 0.038 1.015
Commute evening 0.074 0.045 1.077
Evening 0.010 0.040 0.990
Ref: Commute night
Sunday 0.133** 0.041 0.875
Monday 0.302** 0.047 0.739
Tuesday 0.344** 0.051 0.709
Thursday 0.365** 0.058 0.694
Friday 0.311** 0.044 0.733
Saturday 0.122** 0.052 0.853
Ref: Wednesday
Hashtag 0.217** 0.025 1.242
URL 0.439** 0.026 1.551
Sentiment 0.322** 0.018 1.380
Google search 0.005** 0.001 1.005
Press headlines 0.000* 0.000 1.000
News agent 1.460** 0.044 4.304
Police Agent 1.742** 0.408 5.708
Political agent 0.670** 0.150 1.954
Far right political agent 0.632* 0.327 1.882
Ref: Other agent
Cyber hate speech 0.604** 0.107 0.546
Constant 0.543** 0.126 1.721
Binomial model (inflation/excess zeros)
Number of followers 0.899** 0.017 -
Constant 4.586 0.063 -
Model fit
Log-L 92,196.36
Chi-square 2,594.57
Sig. p¼ 0.00
LRT for alpha¼ 0 p¼ 0.00
Vuong Z¼ 45.00; p¼ 0.00;
Na¼ 210,807
Notes: *p< 0.05, **p¼<0.01.1.aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original
tweets.
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inclusion of hateful or antagonistic content in a tweet reduces the rate of retweet
by a factor of 0.55 (or 45 percent), suggesting that a response to this event that
contains a hateful or antagonistic element, as determined by the machine
classifier, is in fact reducing the likelihood of the tweet being widely spread.
For policymakers, the combination of the cyber hate machine classifier with
the statistical predictive model of the retweet likelihood given the features of the
tweet could be useful in determining the changing dynamic of cyber hate on
Twitter over time, and as an event unfolds. At any point in time a new corpus of
tweets can be collected via the Twitter API, and the number of retweets each
tweet has received is available from the metadata provided by Twitter. If the
machine classifier is used to detect cyber hate within the corpus, and the
statistical model is subsequently rerun, the difference in IRR from one period of
time to another can be illustrative of the changing dynamic of cyber hate in
Twitter over time.
For instance, if the IRR for the “Cyber Hate Speech” predictor in the model is
0.55 at time x, and 0.75 at time y, it suggests an increase in the rate of retweets
containing cyber hate and therefore provides an indication that hateful and
antagonistic content is actually spreading more at time y. One limitation of our
approach is that the classification of cyber hate is dependent upon the language
used in response to an event, which may not predeterminable prior to an event.
Therefore, from these results we are not suggesting that the hate propagation IRR
could be compared to a preevent baseline, rather that while the event is unfolding
policymakers can study fluctuations within the analysis window following the
event. The utility of identifying fluctuations following the event include monitor-
ing the enabling and inhibiting factors of propagation of hate, such as further
connected events (e.g., a protest march, news coverage, published opinion pieces,
and political speeches).
Conclusion
In this article we have developed a supervised machine learning classifier for
hateful and antagonistic content in Twitter. The purpose of the classifier is to
assist policy and decision makers in monitoring the public reaction to large-scale
emotive events, such as the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013.
Previous research showed that 58 percent of hate crimes following 9/11 were
perpetrated two weeks following the event (4 percent of the at-risk period). Data
are available in near-real time from online social networks and microblogging
websites such as Twitter, which can allow us to monitor the prevalence of hateful
and antagonistic responses online in the period immediately following the event,
when risk of hateful responses is highest. Hateful and antagonistic responses
have led to imprisonment of the person posting the tweet—possibly as part of a
risk reduction response by the judicial system.
The classification results showed very high levels of performance at reducing
false positives and produced promising results with respect to false negatives.
Our implementation of individual probabilistic, rule-based, and spatial classifiers
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performed similarly across most feature sets, but the combination of the
classification output of these base classifiers using a voted meta-classifier based
on maximum probability matched or improved on the recall of the base classifiers
in every experiment, suggesting that an ensemble classification approach is most
suitable for classifying cyber hate, given the current feature sets. This could be
due to the noise and variety of types of response within the data, with some
features proving more effective with different classifiers.
The novel inclusion of syntactic features using typed dependencies within
tweets as machine learning features reduced the false negatives by 7 percent over
the baseline BoW features, providing a significant improvement when considering
the volumes of data produced in response to such events. Our corpus of 450,000
tweets was collected in the first two weeks following the event, and it would be
extremely difficult for human effort to manually parse these data to determine
levels of public antagonism within all the responses. The improvement in
machine classification using typed dependencies also suggests that cyber hate
comprises content that is not instantly identifiable by words that are traditionally
associated with hateful and discriminatory remarks, and requires a more nuanced
approach to text classification beyond words alone. For instance, there was a
prevalence of “othering” terms, such as “send them home” and “get them out,”
as well as incitements to undertake hateful retribution such as “burn korans” and
“should be hung.” The typed dependency approach was able to identify these as
useful features for classification.
We developed an illustrative example using cyber hate as classified by a
machine as a predictive feature in a statistical regression model. The model
produced IRRs for retweet activity given a set of features for each tweet. The
model showed a reduction in retweet rate ratio when a tweet contained a hateful
or antagonistic response, suggesting a stemming of the flow of content on Twitter
when a tweet contained cyber hate. This combination of machine classification
and statistical modeling can—while accepting the limitations of machines with
respect to utilizing a learned set of predictive features that are not an absolute
reflection of all the possible combinations and permutations of cyber hate
characteristics—produce aggregated statistics and prevalence indicators for
hateful and antagonistic responses to an event on social media, including the
relative spread of cyber hate on Twitter over time.
Our results are reflective of the individual event under study so we make
no claims as to the generalizability of the classifier or the statistical model.
However, through this case study, we have established for the first time a
method and a set of results that others could replicate following similar and
disparate events, in order to build up a body of work from which more
generalizable results can emerge. For example, following an event prompting a
hateful homophobic response, a data analyst could collect data, perform the
annotation task, and replicate our method. We hope this article acts as a clarion
call for further research into cyber hate and its manifestation in social media
around events, and the development of technical solutions that are informed by
such research.
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